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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

Craft ~~SECRET~~ *Copy 77*
SUBJECT: Chronology of Significant Documents in AMTRUNK File

- 6 Feb 63 - Hqs. cabled JMWAVE it was investigating participants in and reviewing contacts of plan submitted through the State Dept.
- 7 Feb 63 - Traces from JMWAVE Station on participants, some of which looked bad.
- 7 Feb 63 - Hqs. advised JMWAVE that the plan (encrypted AMTRUNK) was presented to CIA through level requiring thorough consideration.
- 9 Feb 63 - Mtg. was held in safehouse in Wash., D.C. between Hurwitch, State Cuban Coordinator; Tad Szulc, New York Times Reporter
Jorge Volsky - USIA
Dr. Nestor MORENO - exile with HEW
Dave Morales - CIA
Al Rodriguez - CIA
Col. A. Davies. - Military contract to CIA
- 11 Feb 63 - CIA planned to notify Hurwitch, Szulc, et al that CIA was interested in op.
- 4 Apr 63 - Cable from Hqs. to certain Stations and Bases stating that CIA was making intensive effort to seek out disaffected key personnel in Cuban Armed Forces, with aim of uniting and turning non-Communist elements against Castro regime.
- 10 Apr 63 - Cable to JMWAVE which confirmed discussion with Ted Shackley at Hqs. that "in view of security considerations and personal differences it was in best interest of personnel of AMTRUNK op and CIA that relationship be terminated. Concluded that odds against effective coordinated effort was unfavorable. We not certain hostile elements were not aware of plan. Best to provide generous financial means for them to proceed independently.

- 17 Apr 63 - Szulc informed Hurwitch that JMWAVE had given Volsky responsibility to decide if the op was to go or not. It was noted that that appeared to be garble of our intentions.
- 5 Aug 63 - Cable to certain Stations and Bases stating response to 4 Apr cable disappointing. Request to develop ops into Cuban Armed Forces was high priority objective of CIA Cuban ops.
- 4 Sept 63 - Three major sources of info. on island of MORENO and Miguel A. DIAZ Isalgue, were Ramon GUIN, Hector RAVELO and Modesto Orlando OROZCO Basulto.
- 5 Sept 63 - Helms and Bolten met with Ralph Dungan at the White House to review the AMTRUNK op. Mtg. was requested by Dungan after his conversation with Szulc. Helms noted that Szulc had been intermediary who introduced MORENO and other AMTRUNK personalities to CIA in Feb 63 and since that time had kept abreast of important developments.
- N.B. Mr. Dungan mentioned a luncheon with a Mr. BUBNOV of the Soviet Embassy who made a strenuous effort to convince him of the advantages of rapprochement with Cuba for both the Soviets and the U.S. BUBNOV indicated that the two great powers "should not let personalities stand in the way" of a peaceful settlement of the Cuban problem. Dungan offered to give Mr. Helms a detailed account of his conversation with BUBNOV at a later date. (Where is it?)

A Vladimir Ivanovich BUBNOV was a Lt. Col. in the GRU as of 1962. He was assigned to the U.N. New York from late 62 to 66. He returned to USSR, was reportedly seen in GRU Hqs. during 66-68. He came back to U.S. in Apr 69 as 2nd Secretary of Soviet Emb. in Wash., D.C. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ and was promoted to 1st Secretary in Apr 74. He was handler in double agent op. and was interested in USAF classified documents .

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- 13 Sept 63 - CUBELA was reportedly close to Ramon GUIN. Miguel DIAZ reportedly stated that he was authorized by "Bob Kennedy" offer large sum money for Mig 21 if Cuban pilot would fly plane to U.S.
- 31 Oct 63 - WAVE belief that MORENO should be disengaged from ops aspects of AMTRUNK op. Arrangements were made to give him key role in Rebel Army radio program. MORENO was very disgruntled for various reasons and stated he would take case to highest authority through VOLSKY and SZULC. It was pointed ~~xxx~~ out that MORENO was vindictive and if not harnessed in effort like radio program, he could blow existing AMTRUNK assets.
- 19 Nov 63 - OWVL message to AMTRUNK agent in Cuba. Asked if he was developing leads into higher echelons of Rebel Army, and the names of higher-levels who appeared to be good prospects for recruitment. Asked if he had made overtures to ALMEIDA.
/ Which ALMEIDA? /
- 19 Nov 63 - OWVL message to agent on island, asking that he tune into Radio Americas a Voz del Jercito Rebelde all nights except Sunday, would carry two major guarantees from U.S. Govt. Program was designed to inspire rebel army to unite and rise in coup against Fidel.
- 26 Jan 65 - OROZCO, after running scared, ^{/unauthorized} was exfiltrated and terminated in Mar 64. In Dec 64 he made trip to Cuba on own which presented security problem since he knew true identified of AMTRUNK internal agents.
- 7 Sept 65 - Cable to WAVE from Hqs. advised that must assume entire AMLASH-1/AMTRUNK/10 (CUBELA/Oscar CHAUVELL Barillar) complex DSE controlled or DSE monitored until CIA had obtained clearer insight into bona fides of CUBELA from intensive interrogation and polygraph of AMWHIP-1.

15 Sept 65

Background of AMTRUNK Op.

AMTRUNK III/IV mounted Aug 63-successful in that MORENO and DIAZ contacted and recruited two principal agents and other action agents to lay groundwork for MHARON aspect of AMTRUNK op.

AMTRUNK-9
AMTRUNK V in early Sept 63, was re-infiltrate /into Cuba. He had exfiled with AMTRUNK IV op.

AMTRUNK VI postponed from Dec 63 to Jan 64 was to revitalize and re-direct efforts of two internal P/A's toward task of spotting and recruiting among high-level figures dissatisfied with Castro Regime. Also to exfiltrate AMTRUNK-9.

AMTRUNK VII attempted three unsuccessful infiltration missions in Feb 64.

AMTRUNK VIII in March 64 exchanged fire with Cuban patrol boat, but went to alternate coastal area where the AMLASH cache was emplaced. (The AMLASH cache was located in late June 64 but only the S/W materials and other relatively minor items were delivered thru the tenuous chain of commo from AMTRUNK-18, who located the cache, to AMTRUNK-15, to AMTRUNK-11 to AMTRUNK-10 to AMLASH-1 in Havana. ETC.

scheduled for
AMTRUNK IX ~~in~~ early Sept 64 was postponed to Oct 64. It was only partly successful. Was the first AMTRUNK infil op in which P/A DIAZ was not member of infil. He had become too familiar ~~and~~ ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ with the AMTRUNK and AMLASH ops and was replaced by AMAGREE-1.

AMTRUNK X ops attempted in Nov and Dec 64 to complete tasks left undone on AMTRUNK IX op were postponed. AMTRUNK-9 was terminated in late Dec 63; then in March 64 went to Cuba on a non-authorized mission ostensibly to rescue a long-time friend who was former ACSI source. Because of AMTRUNK-9's knowledge of ops in the op area, ops in that area had to be suspended.

*Penetration of
Power Center &
Armed Forces of
Cuban Regime - successful*

N.B

The next AMTRUNK op was renamed STEAMER-1.

STEAMER-1 mounted 29 Apr 65 in an attempt to organize another group of contacts in the infil/exfil area into an intell network/ratline which could be used initially to move a subsequent group of MHAPRON recruiters to and from Havana and eventually to form an intelligence network with a resistance capability. It was aborted.

STEAMER-II - not noted.

IV

STEAMER III was launched in late May 65.

They encountered trouble inside and exfiled the following evening. AMAGREE- asked to be relieved as team leader and AMAKA-1 ~~was~~ replaced him.

STEAMER V launched in late July 65, and had to exfil without performing mission AMTRUNKs 16 and 23 were terminated.

The three STEAMER ops failed to set up the ratline. It resulted in the postponement of the second phase of the operation involving MHAPRON recruiters.

STEAMER VII ^{+ VIII - Oct. 65} planned for a duration of 20 days and was to entail establishing the ratline and sending AMTRUNK-21 to Havana to accomplish his objectives and to set up support facilities for his MHAPRON partner, AMTRUNK-22, to be used on later infil. Team members brought back wild tale about how remainder of AMLASH cache (see AMTRUNK VIII) was "returned to the U.S." AMTRUNK-18 said a person who identified himself only as "Bobby", a perfume salesman living in Varadero who was "working with Americans" had transferred the AMLASH cache to a boat from the U.S. in late 64. According to AMTRUNK-18 "Bobby" was a former CIA asset who re-infiltrated Cuba ca. 63 with all necessary documentation to establish himself legally in area. Only ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ salient clue to Bobby's identity is fact he in possession AMLASH cache recovery plan which was either given to him willingly by A-15 or extracted thru DSE investigation. The true names of AMTRUNK-15 and 18 were passed to CUBELA in Paris in Feb 65.

- 14 Apr 66 - UFGA 24967. Stated that in view of the "Bobby" incident, the separate arrests of CUBELA and GUIN - made public in late Feb 66 - did not appear to have been completely coincidental. When the Cuban press identified Miguel DIAZ Isalgue by name as the ~~perxxxxxxx~~ clandestine infiltrator who recruited GUIN in late 63 and the same reports mentioned the involvement of AMTRUNKS 11 and 15 in the same affair, it appeared to cement the mounting assumption that the "Bobby" sponsored maritime exfils participated in by AMTRUNK-18, etc. had been instigated by the DSE in connection with their investigation into the activities of CUBELA and GUIN. The transcript of the CUBELA/GUIN trial made clear that all of the internal assets in some way connected with locating or transporting the CUBELA cache had since been arrested. The DSE investigation surfaced the entire AMTRUNK internal AMTRUNK network.
- 9 Sept 66 - STEAMER IX/X planned beginning on or about 15 Sept 66. with objective to:
- a. infiltrate a trained ops team
 - b. establish an op base
 - c. assess, recruit and train selected targets
 - d. exfiltrate op group
- Ops was cancelled due to suspected presence of radar in area.
- 31 Oct 66 - STEAMER XI/XII planned for ca. N 20 Nov 66. Cancelled due to security problems.

MHADRON

Penetration of the Power Centers and
Armed Forces of the Cuban regime - worldwide.